Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource -but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and 15 collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from 20 relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation -causing the social-ecological system to collapse.
Introduction
The history of mankind is one of gradual change in environmental quality and natural resource abundance, punctuated with sudden collapses of populations, species, ecosystems, and sometimes even of entire civilizations [1, 2] . The most common example is the collapse of the 35 human population on Easter Island following the depletion of forest resources [2, 3] . To explain patterns of gradual change and sudden collapse the literature has focused on the existence of non-linear relationships in the dynamics of renewable natural resources. Examples of natural systems characterized by non-linearities are those that feature a minimum population size below which extinction is inevitable [4, 5] , but also those with complex interactions between the various 40 components of the ecological system as is the case in, for example, shallow lakes and semi-arid ecosystems [6] [7] [8] . The strong non-linearities in the regeneration functions typically give rise to the prediction that continued overharvesting of the resource results in a gradual demise of the resource until a threshold -or tipping point -is reached, beyond which collapse is inevitable and subsequent system restoration is very costly, or even impossible [9] . 45 In this paper we contribute to the literature on tipping points in social-ecological systems by analyzing how social interactions between the users of a natural system affect its resilience.
Building on [10] [11] [12] [13] we use evolutionary game theory to develop a model in which a finite number of community members have access to a commonly owned renewable resource. As is the case in the real world, we assume that the common property regime is such that community 50 members are allowed to harvest the resource, but that they are not allowed to hire noncommunity members to engage in resource harvesting too if their own time constraint is binding [14] . Next, natural regeneration is captured by a standard logistic growth function, and community members can decide to act cooperatively by limiting their extraction, or not. Agents are tempted to act non-cooperatively (also referred to as defecting) because of the higher 55 associated profits, but we also allow for the possibility that whenever a cooperator and a defector meet, the cooperator may convince the defector of the social desirability of acting cooperatively.
The diffusion of social norms regarding harvesting is thus assumed to take place via interpersonal relations, with cooperation being "contagious" [15] [16] [17] [18] ; see [19] for empirical evidence in the context of renewable resource use. This modeling approach is consistent with the 60 experimental evidence that verbal expressions of discontent can induce and sustain cooperation in social dilemma situations [20] , but the mechanism can also be interpreted as reflecting peerto-peer sanctions or rewards [21] [22] [23] .
Our paper generates tipping points without explicitly introducing (strong) non-linearities in the dynamics of either the ecological system or the social-economic system. The resource's 65 logistic growth function implies that the percentage rate of resource regeneration increases linearly with resource scarcity, and the social-economic system is self-stabilizing as well. If, for whatever reason, the number of cooperators increases, the social pressure on defectors rises, but the benefits of defecting are larger too. Despite this apparent stability of its two components, the system can still generate positive feedbacks between them, giving rise to multiple equilibria. For 70 some range of parameter values the "good equilibrium" can be very resilient to exogenous shocks or external developments (such as population growth or technological progress in harvesting), while the same exogenous changes cause the social-ecological system to collapse if the parameters are close enough to a critical threshold. The positive feedbacks (giving rise to tipping points) emerge because the property rights regime implies that each community 75 member's harvesting time endowment is finite. If an exogenous shock causes a decline in the resource stock, the socially optimal individual harvesting effort level decreases. Cooperation thus requires agents to decrease their effort levels, and hence the temptation to defect increases with resource scarcity. As a result, more cooperators decide to defect, putting even more pressure on the resource stock. This leads to a spiral of depletion and defection, and eventually, the system 80 flips to the "bad" equilibrium. The societal consequences of such a flip can be substantial because the system exhibits hysteresis. Upon system collapse, moving back to the "good equilibrium" can be difficult and costly -if it is feasible at all.
We thus show that collapse can be caused by interpersonal interactions and economic constraints, rather than by the presence of inherently non-linear functional forms. In that sense, 85 our model is related to models that generates tipping points in a general equilibrium framework because of interactions between economic sectors, with increased harvesting in the resource sector imposing a negative externality on another sector, resulting in even more intensive resource harvesting [24, 25] . Our focus on the social dynamics at the community level is especially relevant because of the role of social norms in community governance of common 90 pool resources such as fish, forests, or grazing lands [26] [27] [28] . Our paper identifies a mechanism why community resource management can be successful in some situations and not in others, and is even relevant for resources whose regeneration functions are not characterized by strong non-linearities. As such, the mechanism may have been one of the factors that contributed to social-ecological collapses in the past [29, 30] . But the insights obtained by this paper may also 95 be relevant for today's policy makers. If centralized enforcement is cheap and effective, community resource management is inefficient. But if the monitoring and policing costs of formal regulation are high (for example when it regards resources that are geographically remote), community management may be more efficient as long as the community's support for the social harvesting norms is sufficiently large, and this paper provides insights into the "early 100 warning signals" for the government to start intervening to prevent collapse. In that sense the paper also complements the literature in which a formal regulator aims to enforce property rights [31, 32] .
Our paper is, however, not the first in noting that coupled social-ecological systems can be inherently complex [33] [34] [35] . Iwasa et al. [36] analyze a system in which agents are more inclined 105 to undertake pollution-mitigating activities when the environmental quality is poor, and also when social pressure is high. In their model, alternative stable states occur when social pressure increases strongly with the fraction of cooperators in the community. This framework has been extended to incorporate non-linear resource dynamics as well, leading to even richer dynamics [37] . Taylor [25] develops a minimum viable population model in which resource extraction has 110 a negative effect on the profitability of a competing sector, rendering extraction even more attractive. Our paper is complementary to this research in that we do not use any functional forms that, by themselves, give rise to tipping points; in our model collapse can occur because of personal interactions, and the fact that individuals' time endowments are not infinite.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the model, focusing on the 115 mechanisms driving changes in the size of the resource stock and on those affecting the number of cooperating individuals in the community. The analysis is fairly complex, and hence we present the intuition behind the underlying mechanism in section 3, providing the proofs as well as a numerical robustness analysis in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
120

2
The model
We assume that there are N > 1 agents in a community who have access to a commonly-owned natural resource. The right to extract is exclusively associated with community membership; community members are not allowed to employ outsiders to assist in harvesting [14] . The size of the resource stock at time t is denoted by ( ). X t Each agent is endowed with a fixed effort level ê 125 which she can allocate to harvesting the common pool resource, or to an alternative economic activity. The amount of effort agent i (i = 1…N) allocates to resource harvesting at time t is denoted by ( ) i e t . Assuming that the return to effort in the alternative economic activity is constant and equal to w, the income agent i derives from this activity at time t is equal to ( )(
) ,where 0 ( ) . 
Ph t PqX t e t =
Harvesting gives rise to an intertemporal negative externality as excessive extraction today reduces the size of the available 140 resource stock tomorrow. This intertemporal consequence of today's harvesting is sometimes referred to as the "Class I problem" [38] . "Class II problem" then refers to the problem caused by instantaneous externalities, where an agent's return to her harvesting effort in a specific period negatively depends on the total effort put in by the N -1 agents in the community in that same period -think of congestion or crowding. In this paper, we do not just account for the 145 intertemporal externality; we also introduce an instantaneous one (see below). We do so for two reasons. First, while the intertemporal externality may be economically more severe in the real world than the instantaneous ones, the latter tend to be important too [39] [40] [41] . Second, analyzing the consequences of an instantaneous externality on (myopic) agents' propensity to cooperate, is much less complicated than in case of forward-looking agents trying to solve the intertemporal 150 externality, while the underlying mechanism that is explored here is essentially the same.
We follow [42] [43] [44] 1 Note that the crowding costs are assumed independent of the wage rate, implying that we focus on crowding resulting in increased expenditures on for example fuel or nets. We do so because in section 4.1 setting the wage rate equal to zero considerably facilitates the analytical solutions. If congestion costs were assumed to exclusively consist of forgone income from outside employment, there would be no externality in section 4.1. For consistency we thus need to assume that there are cost components other than foregone income as well. As the wage rate is assumed to be exogenous, making the congestion costs dependent on the wage rate increases complexity without yielding additional insights. Therefore we chose to capture the congestion costs by a specific constant, v. 2 We model crowding as a cost component rather than via the production function (with crowding reducing harvesting productivity; cf. [41, 45] ) to keep the model analytically tractable. The latter modeling approach would imply that the harvesting production function equals ( ) We assume that agents can choose between two types of behavior: to act cooperatively, or to "defect". All agents are aware of the social benefits of internalizing the (instantaneous and/or 170 the intertemporal) negative externalities, and some of them decide to act cooperatively. Those who do, are assumed to put in their fair share (i.e., 1/N) of the socially optimal aggregate harvesting effort (that is, the one that solves (3) given the current size of X). Others, however, decide to act non-cooperatively because of the higher profits associated with defection. Each agent that defects is assumed to choose the effort level that maximizes his private welfare level 175
given the aggregate amount of effort put in by the 1 N − other agents. 4 Using superscripts C and resource stock (see (1)) would be specified as
. The severity of the crowding externality would then not just affect profits but it would also shift the nullcline of the resource. This would complicate the analytical solution substantially without yielding any new insights, and hence we decided to model the instantaneous externality via crowding costs rather than via decreased harvesting productivity. What is essential for our model is that agents are tempted to defect because of differences in profits between acting cooperatively and selfishly, and this is the case if one agent's effort decreases the returns other agents receive on their harvesting effort, but also if it increases the per-unit harvesting costs of the other agents. 3 From here onwards we omit time arguments, unless omitting them may cause confusion. 4 Most evolutionary game theory models on cooperation and defection assume that effort levels chosen only depend on the behavioral mode chosen (cooperation, or defection), but not on the size of the resource stock [10] [11] [12] [13] . In other words, effort is either "high" or "low", depending on whether an individual is a cooperator or not. In our model, the D to respectively denote cooperators and defectors, the above assumptions imply that 
where ( ) C t denotes the number of cooperators at time t, and β is the percentage decrease in ( ) C t associated with a one unit decrease in / .
Next, we assume that whenever a cooperator meets a defector, there is a probability µ that the former succeeds in convincing the latter to act cooperatively. Assuming that social encounters occur randomly, the probability of a cooperator meeting a defector can be modeled as 185
to denote the current number of defectors in the community, the probability of an encounter taking place in time interval ( ,
where λ is the Poisson parameter. Social pressure thus increases the number of cooperators by (
, where α λµ ≡ . Using the continuous-time equivalent and combining the effects of social pressure and temptation, we have: 190 allocation of effort is endogenous. This assumption is not just realistic, it also is crucial for explaining under what circumstances a community is able to maintain cooperation, and when cooperation collapses. 5 Agents are not divisible, and denoting the change in cooperators by dC/dt implies a slight abuse of notation as this suggests that we do not explicitly constrain the change to be an integer number. Similarly, the equilibrium number of cooperators is not exactly at the point where dC/dt = 0 (cf. equation (A1) in the Appendix), but the first integer number above the C that solves dC/dt = 0. Explicitly acknowledging indivisibilities complicates the notation without affecting the essence of the results as long as the number of agents is sufficiently large (as assumed in this paper).
Equation (4) thus captures what we label "contagious cooperation with the temptation to defect", and relies essentially on three assumptions. First, some agents are willing to uphold a social extraction norm (doing what is optimal for the group as a whole), and try to impose social pressure on non-cooperators to also start adhering to the norm [20, 46, 47] . Second, the propensity 195 to (dis)obey a cooperative norm depends on the temptation to defect, but also on whether individuals have recently been exposed to cooperatively-minded agents. There is a vast literature on the role of personal encounters in spreading social norms (see for example [48] [49] [50] [51] ). Face-toface communication is found to be very effective in inducing cooperation in laboratory experiments, and much more so than alternative modes of communication [46] . Being confronted 200 with other people's behavior conveys information and induces people to update their "best mode of behavior" cf. [18, 49] . Indeed, even subtle cues of peer pressure are often enough to induce rule-obeying behavior [48] . The idea of being watched (even if this is induced by mere photographs of human eyes) tends to improve rule-compliance [52] . And if social interactions are repetitive, the resulting behavior can become a social norm [50] which may subsequently be 205 internalized [51] . The mechanisms by which cooperation spreads include moral persuasion, social pressure and feelings of guilt [20, 47, [53] [54] [55] [56] .
7 Third, the probability of a cooperator meeting a defector follows a random Poisson process. This last assumption is more likely to be (4)). This is neither plausible nor very interesting, and hence we assume that ( 1) / (2 ) . N N α β > − met in some circumstances (e.g., when defectors can hide their harvests so that cooperators can only indentify defectors "in the field") but not in all -allowing for targeted encounters would be 210 an interesting extension of the model.
3
Gradual changes in cooperation and resource conservation, and sudden collapse 215
The analysis of why the social-ecological system (1)- (4) is characterized by multiple equilibria is complicated. Because of this, we first provide the intuition behind the mechanism in this section, and present all the proofs and robustness checks in the next.
The mechanism giving rise to positive feedbacks and multiple equilibria is as follows. To maintain cooperation, social pressure should be sufficiently large, and the temptation to defect 220 should be sufficiently small; see (4). The strength of social pressure is a function of the number of cooperators: the larger is C, the larger the pressure on defectors to change their behavior. The temptation to defect is also a function of the number of cooperators. For given X the temptation to defect (weakly) increases with C because of the following. Solving (3), cooperators aim to maximize the (net present value of the) total amount of resource rents accruing to the 225 community. They take into account the (instantaneous and/or intertemporal) negative externalities associated with their harvesting activities, and hence they put in less effort into harvesting than defectors ( D C e e ≤ ). 8 The larger C, the larger the available amount of resource rents, and hence the more tempting it is to defect and appropriate these rents. 8 Recall that we assume that all agents know the current resource stock and the socially optimal effort level is public knowledge. Furthermore, defectors can infer the number of cooperators, for example by observing their own net returns to harvesting (from which they can derive the total amount of harvesting effort put in by the rest of the So, the temptation to defect depends on C, but it is a function of the size of the remaining 230 stock as well. Perhaps surprisingly, the smaller X, the larger is the temptation to defect.
Cooperators take into account the negative harvesting externalities and switch to interior effort levels at an earlier stage of resource depletion than defectors. Thus, With these mechanisms in mind, we now address the question why the social-ecological system may experience periods of gradual change, punctuated by sudden collapse. Suppose that, for a given set of parameters, the net social marginal harvesting productivity is larger than the wage rate even if all agents harvest as much as they can (î e e = for all i = 1…N). Then it is socially optimal for each agent to put in ˆ. 
)). 245
So how do exogenous developments such as technical progress or population growth affect the critical effort endowment 0 ( ) e • for which Ĉ e e = ? An increase in q or N amplifies thecommunity). These assumptions are fairly standard in economics but not necessarily very realistic. However, note that our results hold as long as cooperators choose lower effort levels than defectors. Hence, all we need is that defectors try to appropriate (part of) the resource rents created by other community members acting cooperatively, and this assumption is likely to be met in the real world too. 9 Hence, 0 e is a function of all system parameters except α and β. As long as Ĉ e e ≥ there is no temptation to defect, and hence the probability of a cooperator convincing a defector to become cooperative, is immaterial too.
effective -labor input in harvesting: 0 ( ) / 0 e q ∂ • ∂ < 10 and 0 ( ) / 0 e N ∂ • ∂ < . The larger N or q, the lower the socially optimal individual effort level and hence the smaller the critical effort endowment level for which a social dilemma materializes. 250
As long as the parameter set is such that 0ˆ( ) e e < • we have full cooperation, and increases in N or q result in a gradual decrease in the size of the resource stock, because (effective) labor input in harvesting increases. If exogenous developments in N, q, or any other parameter cause 0 ( ) e • to fall below ˆ, e the social dilemma emerges and cooperators choose interior effort levels.
We then have ˆ,
C D e e e < = and we also have (2)). As long as 0ˆ( ) e e − • is positive 255 but sufficiently close to zero, the decrease in cooperation and resource conservation is small, because temptation to defect is small (as X is large) while the probability of a defector meeting a cooperator, is high (as C is large).
However, we can identify a tipping point, 2 ( , , , , , , , , ), e r P q N v w δ α β where the same gradual changes cause the social-ecological system to collapse. For the system to be in steady state, we 260 need dX/dt = 0 and dC/dt = 0 (cf. (1) and (4)). At 2 ( ), e • the steady state is stable, but the nullclines of X and C are just tangent. That means that any change in N, q, or any other parameter can cause the equilibrium to disappear, triggering a spiral of defection and resource depletion. As before, changes in N or q cause cooperators to reduce their harvesting effort levels, while defectors continue to allocate their entire time endowment to harvesting. As a result
decreases, some cooperators defect, aggregate harvesting effort increases, and the resource stock is reduced further. This induces cooperators to reduce their harvesting effort even more, thus 10 At least, for 2 / ; q rv P > see Appendix 3. resulting in an even stronger decrease in the payoff ratio, and a spiral of defection and resource depletion unfolds. This positive feedback mechanism gives rise to a rapid deterioration of both cooperation and the resource stock, and the negative spiral is stopped only when (almost) all 270 rents have been dissipated. That is, if the average net private return on harvesting effort is equal to the wage rate (possibly zero), such that defectors are indifferent between putting an extra unit of effort into harvesting, or not. Hence, if 2 ( ) e • falls below ˆ, e the system moves from an equilibrium with reasonably high levels of cooperation and resource conservation (the "good equilibrium"), to one characterized by little cooperation and near-complete rent dissipation (the 275 "bad equilibrium").
11
The typical pattern is depicted in Figure 1 . On the horizontal axis we plot 0/ ( ), e e • which portrays the strength of the social dilemma and on the vertical axes C and X (in Panels A and B, respectively). We plot 0/ ( ) e e • rather than just ê to emphasize that a change in any parameter can cause the number of equilibria to change -not just changes in ê itself. The straight lines 280 connect the system's stable steady states that emerge under various parameter constellations, while the dashed lines indicate unstable steady states. There are two branches of stable equilibria (for both C and X), an upper and a lower branch. An equilibrium located on the lower branch is characterized by very low levels of cooperation and with relatively small resource stocks -all resource rents have been dissipated, and hence we refer to this equilibrium as the "bad 285 11 Note that, unlike 0 e , 2 e is a function of α and β -as well as of all other system parameters ( , , , , , , ).
r P q N v w δ The larger the steady-state number of cooperators, the larger the defectors' optimal amount of effort, and hence the more likely it is that a given time endowment ê is binding. Hence, the probability of a defector facing a binding time constraint is smaller the larger is α and the smaller is β (cf. (4) and also (A12) in Appendix A3).
equilibrium". The upper branch connects all the "good equilibria" -those characterized by relatively high levels of C and X.
<Insert < becomes socially optimal while it is privately optimal to continue putting in ê (that is, ˆ).
D
e e = Cooperation then decreases as the temptation to defect increases, but the resource stock itself does not fall by much. This is because cooperators compensate for the extra effort put in by the new defectors by choosing lower effort levels themselves, thus 300 limiting the increase in aggregate harvesting effort. As long as ê is below a second threshold level (or tipping point), 1 ( , , , , , , , , ), e r P q N v w δ α β there is just one stable equilibrium, the good one. The assumptions of agents being myopic and fully dependent on the resource are analytically convenient but maybe not always equally realistic. Therefore, we relax the 330 assumption of no external labor market in section 4.2. Analytically solving the case of w > 0 is cumbersome, and hence we rely on numerical methods (together with a robustness analysis testing whether the mechanism is the same for all possible drivers of change -population growth, technical progress, etc.). In section 4.3 we drop the assumption of agents being ignorant of the intertemporal externality (that is, we then assume 0).
δ ≥ 335
Cooperation and collapse when agents are myopic and dependent on the resource
In this subsection we assume that community members are aware of the instantaneous crowding externality (the Class II problem) but that they do not take the intertemporal externality (the Class I problem) into account -because they are not fully informed about the dynamics of 340 resource regeneration, or simply because they are myopic. Letting δ → ∞ in (3), the relevant benchmark for cooperation is the aggregate effort level E ɶ that maximizes the community's instantaneous aggregate income while taking into account the Class II problem:
Following Bischi et al. [59] , we assume that cooperators always put in their fair share of the 345 aggregate effort, ( ) ( ) / C e X E X N = ɶ . Solving (5) and dividing by N, we have: 
and using (6), the equilibrium effort of defectors is: 
Note that the harvesting effort of defectors depends on both X and C. In steady state we have dX/dt = 0 and dC/dt = 0 (cf. (1) and (4) Proof: This follows immediately from inserting w = 0 into (6) and (8) and noting that ( )
In region 1 (R1) the resource is sufficiently abundant so that there is no social dilemma (yet). In R2 defectors still allocate all their available effort to harvesting, but cooperators choose interior 375 effort levels -and the latter type's effort level is smaller, the lower the remaining resource stock.
In R3 both types choose interior effort levels (with 
The nullclines of C and X are also depicted in Figures 2A and 2B , and their locations and slopes are derived in Lemmas 2 and 3 below. Before doing that, two things should be noted about regions R1-R3. First, because defectors choose interior effort levels in R3, we can conclude that (almost) all resource rents are dissipated in this region -if not, it would pay for 385 selfish agents to put in extra effort. 13 This implies that the aggregate payoff of the community decreases when the system moves from R1 to R3: the smaller the resource stock, the lower the aggregate welfare, and the higher the need for cooperation. Second, the payoff ratio π π is equal to unity in R1, that it decreases when the stock is being depleted in R2, and that it reaches its minimum (and remains constant) as soon as the system is in R3.
Hence, while the need for cooperation increases when the system moves down from R1 via R2 to R3, the temptation to defect increases too. Having identified the three regions, let us now have a 395 closer look at the dC/dt = 0 isocline; see also Figure 2A . 13 Indeed, for all 0 w ≥ and using (6) and (8) 
Lemma 2.2:
with the inequality being strict in R2.
Lemma 2.3:
Proof: See appendix A1. ■ is high when X is small, and hence the equilibrium number of cooperators is smaller the lower is X. The nullcline of cooperation is vertical at C = N in R1 because the temptation to defect is zero, while it is vertical in R3 because here / C D e e is a function of C but not of X; see (9.R3).
Next, Lemma 2.2 states that the larger is the effort endowment ê, the more the dC/dt = 0 415 isocline is located to the left in (C,X) space in R2. The larger is ê, the less constrained defectors are in their harvesting activities, the larger the temptation to defect and hence the smaller the equilibrium number of cooperators that can be sustained at any X.
Finally, Lemma 2.3 states that the nullcline of C is an attractor. For any given X, the larger is C, the larger the temptation to defect (because E is smaller), and the smaller the number of 420 defectors becoming cooperators (as there are relatively few defectors). Hence, for a given X the strength of social pressure is larger (smaller) than the temptation to defect if C is small (large).
Let us now derive the dX/dt = 0 isocline, which we denote by -the steady state must be located in R1: the total amount of effort available ( ) Ne is too small for the community to be able to draw down the 435 resource stock to a level below the one where harvesting becomes a social dilemma. The case of 0ˆ( ) e e > • (as described in Lemma 3.2) is more interesting, and is depicted in Figure 2B . In that case, the equilibria are located in R2 or even R3, and never in R1. That means that the nullcline 0 2 /2rPq N e e rv Pq ≤ ≡ + of X then consists of two segments, one in each region. In R2 it is upward-sloping (and concave).
The larger is C, the lower is E, and hence the larger the resource stock that can be sustained in 440 equilibrium. However, in R3 the X nullcline is (almost) horizontal because here all agents choose interior harvesting effort levels: if one defector decides to start acting cooperatively, the decrease in E is negligible because all other defectors increase their effort levels in response.
Regarding the location of dX/dt = 0, Lemma 3.3 states that it is located farther to the South in (C,X) space the larger is ê. The larger the effort endowment, the less agents are constrained in 445 their harvesting, and hence (for every C and keeping everything else constant) the smaller the equilibrium size of the resource stock. And regarding the dynamics of resource regeneration, Lemma 3.4 states that the nullcline of X is an attractor. For any C, the lower is X, the smaller the aggregate quantity harvested (because of lower aggregate effort, and because of lower marginal productivity of effort), and the higher percentage resource growth rate; cf. (1) . That means that 450 for given C, regeneration is larger (smaller) than the quantity harvested if X is small (large).
Having derived the shape and location of the two nullclines, we can determine the number of steady states of the system. Visual inspection of Figure 2 suggests that the nullclines can intersect once, twice or three times. Proposition 1 proves the existence of multiple equilibria. • , where ( ) e e e • < < • , the nullclines intersect once in R2 giving rise to just one equilibrium (C 2 ,X 2 ); see Figure 3A . 480 An increase in ê beyond 1 ( ) e • causes alternative stable states to emerge in the range 1 2ˆ( ) ( ) e e e • < < • ; see Figure 3B . 15 As stated in Proposition 1.2, there are then three equilibria, two of which are located in R2 (denoted (C 2 ,X 2 ) and (C 2B ,X 2B )), and one in R3, (C 3 ,X 3 ). Of these, (C 2 ,X 2 ) and C 3 ,X 3 ) are locally stable, while (C 2B ,X 2B ) is unstable. When ê increases in the range implying that (C 3 ,X 3 ) is the only remaining equilibrium -as depicted in Figure 3C . 16, 17 Figure 3 reveals the exact mechanics giving rise to the bifurcation diagrams presented in Figure 1 . 18 For 0ˆ( ) e e < • there is no social dilemma and just one stable equilibrium, (C 1 ,X 1 ), located in R1. The system is located on the upper branches of Panels A and B in Figure 1 , with 490 Figure 3A applies, and there is a unique equilibrium: (C 2 ,X 2 ) in the North-East of R2 (implying C 2 < N). In Figures 1A and 1B this equilibrium is located on the 15 In fact, 1 ( ) e • is defined as a fold bifurcation at which the "bad equilibrium" (C 3 ,X 3 ) is located on the boundary between R2 and R3, where cooperators choose interior effort levels but where the defectors' effort constraint is weakly binding; see equation (A7) in appendix A3. 16 Here, 2 ( ) e • is defined as a fold bifurcation at which two nullclines are tangent in R2 (implying that the cooperators choose interior effort levels whereas the effort constrain of defectors is strictly binding); see equation (A12) in appendix A3. 17 The relevance of the time constraint (relative to the rest of the system's parameters) is immediately clear from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. If agents have unlimited amounts of effort at their disposal, the effort levels chosen are, by definition, interior, and then Lemma 1 indicates that the system is always in R3. In Figure 2 R1 and R2 are no longer relevant, and the isoclines in R3 just intersect just once -see also Proposition 1 and Appendix A3. With unlimited time endowments (that is, if agents can hire outside labor), the system is de facto open access, and hence the bad equilibrium is its unique steady state. 18 Indeed, Figure 1 Figure 3C applies, (C 3 ,X 3 ) in R3 is the unique equilibrium (implying that X 3 is very close to the Nash equilibrium steady state stock), and it is located on the lower branches of Panels A and B in Figure 1 . And path-dependency emerges in the system because of 495 the fact that there are two stable equilibria in case 1 2ˆ( ) ( ) e e e • < < • ; see Figure 3B . Whether the system is in equilibrium (C 2 ,X 2 ) or rather in (C 3 ,X 3 ), depends on whether the system approaches the threshold from a situation in which 2ˆ( ), e e < • or rather 2ˆ( ). e e > • In the first case, the system is in the good equilibrium (C 2 ,X 2 ) -on the upper branches in Figure 1 -until it collapses when exogenous changes move the system beyond tipping point 2 ( ) e • , when the positive feedback 500 identified in section 3 brings the system down to the bad equilibrium (C 3 ,X 3 ). 19 Having passed it becomes more tempting to defect. As was the case in Figure 1 , the system only flips back to the good equilibrium if ê falls below 1 ( ) e • .
Having established that qualitatively the same patterns emerge for w > 0 as for w = 0 (with 540 δ→∞), we probe further into the robustness of our results and interpretations by numerically solving the system when changing the various key parameters, and then especially q, N, v and α.
Figures 4C-4F indicate that increases in the harvesting technology parameter (q) and in the size of the population (N) yield qualitatively similar patterns as when ê increases -not surprisingly, the only difference is that X continues to fall when q increases ( Figure 4D ). Next, if the 545 instantaneous externality becomes more severe (that is, if v is larger), the steady-state resource stock tends to be larger ( Figure 4H ) while the equilibrium number of cooperators tends to be smaller ( Figure 4G ). The larger is v, the higher the need for cooperation, but also the more costly it is to cooperate. So the increase in X in Figure 4H does not occur because of an increase in C, but in spite of a decrease thereof. 20 The consequences of changes in α, the social pressure 550 parameter, are presented in Figures 4I and 4J . These figures show that for low initial levels of α, 20 Interestingly, the welfare effects of higher crowding costs v are ambiguous. While an increase in v always decreases welfare in regions 1 and 3, it may increase welfare in region 2. The presence of crowding costs reduces aggregate effort, and hence higher v always attenuate the stock externality (the Class I problem). We find that in region 2 the welfare increases resulting from the reduced intertemporal externality can dominate the welfare costs associated with larger instantaneous crowding costs, but only for intermediate levels of v. Hence, our results are similar to those established empirically by [61] in case of the shrimp fishery in North Carolina. increases in the strength of persuasion do not have much impact on either C or X -until α reaches a tipping point. After crossing this threshold the system jumps to a much higher level of both cooperation and resource conservation, and the system is also quite robust against possible weakening of social pressure. If α has increased sufficiently for the system to flip to the good 555 equilibrium, α can fall substantially before the system flips back to the bad equilibrium. Again, this is a direct result of the system exhibiting alternative stable states.
Exogenous developments in the system parameters all give rise to the same dynamics as do changes in ê itself -see section 4.1. All qualitative results obtained analytically assuming w = 0 carry over to the case of w > 0 (with δ→∞), and also the policy implications remain unchanged. 560
If X is observed to stabilize at an intermediately high level this is no guarantee that the system is resilient against shocks. And if the system has collapsed, restoring the system to the good equilibrium requires changing the system parameters such that 2ˆ( ) e e << • .
Ecosystem collapse when agents are aware of both the Class I and II problems (δ≥0) 565
Let us now consider the case where the community members are aware of both the instantaneous and intertemporal externality. Each defector takes into account the instantaneous externality vE -i caused by the effort decisions of all community members, but ignores both the instantaneous and intertemporal consequences of his actions on the welfare of others. Hence, the best response function of defectors is still given by (7). Cooperators put in their fair share of the socially 570 optimal aggregate harvesting effort, taking into account the two types of externalities. Hence, they solve (3) where 0.
δ ≥ Let us use z ɶ ɶ to denote the socially optimal steady state level of variable z when agents take into account both the Class I and Class II problem of resource harvesting. It is fairly straightforward to determine ( )
But it is very difficult to derive the socially optimal trajectories towards ( )
and it is also not very likely that communities in the real world are able to do that. Therefore, we assume that cooperators adopt a simple stock-dependent harvest strategy [62, 63] <Insert Figure 5 about here> 580
The bifurcation diagrams presented in Figure 5 are qualitatively identical to those in Figures 1   and 4 . 22 Indeed, the underlying mechanism is the same: the instantaneous profits earned by defectors are always at least as high as those earned by cooperators, socially optimal harvesting decreases with stock size, and the time constraint ceases to be binding for defectors at a stock 585 size that is lower than the stock size at which cooperators start choosing interior effort levels.
The main difference is that maintaining cooperation is even more difficult than in the case in which agents are unaware of the intertemporal (or Class I) externality. Compared to the case of agents being myopic, the cooperators reduce their effort levels even more for every X because they now take both externalities into account. That means that for given C the payoff ratio 590
π π is even lower, and hence (i) collapse occurs sooner (i.e., all else equal, at lower levels of ê , q, N, etc.), and (ii) the number of cooperators in the bad equilibrium is even smaller. This may 21 We assume cooperators adopt adaptive management (so that a < 0 and b > 0) aimed at steering the system towards the optimal steady state. Furthermore, a and b are set such that each cooperator invests ( ) explain why communities are better able at overcoming the crowding externality than at solving the intertemporal one [64, 65] .
Finally, note that while the collapse of the social-ecological system did not result in the 595 total demise of the resource, setting w = v = 0 in the intertemporal problem the resource is fully exhausted if the system falls to its bad equilibrium. While the static externality (or a positive wage rate) makes it uneconomical to actually deplete the resource, the intertemporal one does not: as long as the instantaneous benefits of harvesting are positive, defectors continue to extract, and even the last unit will be harvested if the social system collapses. 600
Conclusions
We developed a model of renewable resource use in which agents can decide to act cooperatively with respect to resource harvesting or behave selfishly. Adherence to social harvesting norms can spread through the community because of interpersonal relationships 605 between cooperators and defectors (because the former try to convince the latter of the social desirability of acting cooperatively), but community members also always face the temptation to act non-cooperatively -because of the higher profits. The resulting social-ecological system is characterized by multiple equilibria, so that small changes in key parameters (such as population growth and technological progress) can trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high 610 levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation -causing the demise of the resource. Our setup is unique in that tipping points emerge even though both the ecological and the socialeconomic systems, by themselves, are inherently stable.
Positive feedback relationships occur in our model because of the fact that, in closed communities, the amount of labor a community member can allocate to resource harvesting is 615 necessarily finite because the property right system usually does not allow members to hire external labor. If the resource becomes scarcer, for example due to unfavorable climatic conditions, the cooperators in the community decrease their harvesting effort while defectors continue to allocate all their available time to harvesting -if the net private marginal benefits of harvesting are strictly positive. A decrease in the size of the resource thus increases the relative 620 profitability of defecting, and makes cooperation even more costly. Fewer cooperators are unable to maintain sufficient social pressure, thus triggering even stronger defection and resource depletion. Thus, a positive feedback between the resource stock and the number of cooperators emerges endogenously -possibly resulting in the collapse of the social-ecological system.
Our model is purely theoretical in nature, but it does yield an important policy implication. 625
If a regulator is monitoring the ecological system, she must be aware of potential collapses of cooperation in communities having access to renewable resources even if there are no nonlinearities in the resource dynamics themselves. Monitoring the system is important because it is characterized by hysteresis. Upon collapse, it is not sufficient to reverse the small exogenous change that caused the system to collapse. More draconic measures are needed to generate a 630 spiral of increasing cooperation and resource regeneration -possibly at very high cost.
Appendix A1: Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1: 
e e π π = into (4) and setting dC/dt = 0, we have 
Proof of Lemma 2.2: This can trivially be inferred from (A1).
Proof of Lemma 2.3:
The nullcline is concave in R2 for
And because 
W r X q Ce X N C e C X ≡ − − + − and using (6) and (8), . Solving, 3 3 ( , ) C X is an equilibrium in R3 iff 670 e ≤ the system's equilibrium is 1 1 ( , ) C X as defined in (A4), if 685 0 1ˆê e e < < there is just one equilibrium ( 2 2 ( , ) C X as defined in (A8) and (A9)), if 2ê e > there is just one equilibrium ( 3 3 ( , ) C X as defined in (A5) and (A6)), and if 1 2ˆê e e < < there are three Writing down the current value Hamiltonian of (3), taking the appropriate first derivates, setting all time derivatives equal to zero and solving, the socially optimal steady state levels of E and X (denoted by E ɶ ɶ and ) X ɶ ɶ are implicitly determined by the following two equations: so is the origin of the system; cf. (1) and (4). As these three equilibria are unstable, we omit them in this figure. 
